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Jason MacLean*

Autonomy in the Anthropocene?
Libertarianism, Liberalism, and the Legal
Theory of Environmental Regulation

Can there be autonomy in the Anthropocene? Libertarian environmental law
scholar Bruce Pardy's Ecolawgic: The Logic of Ecosystems and the Rule of Law
argues that contemporary environmental law violates the right to autonomy and
runs afoul of the rule of law. Pardy proposes an alternative model of environmental
law premised on the logic of ecosystems and free markets. Pardy's Ecolawgic
suffers, however from the very same conceptual infirmities that substantially
undermine the real-world application of the free market paradigm on which
Ecolawgic is largely based. Notwithstanding this critical flaw, Ecolawgic may
be read as an aspirational model of environmental law and policy capable of
disciplining the practice of environmental governance. The result-"autonomy
in the Anthropocene"-gestures toward a pluralist and polycentric model of
environmental regulation capable of enhancing our freedom to fashion a collective
future in an existentially threatening epoch of our own making.

Peut-il y avoir une autonomie dans I'anthropocene?Dans Ecolawgic: The Logic of
Ecosystems and the Rule of Law, Bruce Pardy juriste libertarien et spdcialiste du
droit de Ienvironnement, soutient que le droit contemporain de Ienvironnement
viole le droit a 'autonomie et contrevient au principe de la primaut6 du droit.
Bruce Pardy propose un modele different du droit de Ienvironnement fond6
sur la logique des 6cosystemes et du libre march6. Ecolawgic souffre toutefois
des m~mes carences conceptuelles qui minent considdrablement I'application
dans le monde du paradigme du libre march6 sur lequel il se fonde. Malgr6 ce
ddfaut critique, Ecolawgic peut 6tre lu en tant que modele ambitieux de droit
et de politique de Ienvironnement, modele capable d'imposer une discipline
a la pratique de Iintendance environnementale. Le rdsultat-< autonomie
dans I'anthropocene >-mene
a un modele pluraliste et polycentrique de
rdglementation environnementale capable de renforcer notre libert6 de modeler
un futur collectif dans ce qui est une 6poque existentiellement menagante de
notre propre fabrication.

* Assistant Professor, University of Saskatchewan College of Law. I thank Jocelyn Stacey for her
insightful comments on a draft, and Bruce Pardy and Sara Slinn for their helpful and encouraging
comments on a presentation of an earlier version of this paper.
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Introduction
I.
II.

The logic ofEcolawgic
The trouble with the principle of autonomy, or why nature needs no
manifesto
III. "I've found a flaw ": The myth of naturallyfree and self-correcting
markets
IV. What is the rule ofenvironmentallaw? It depends on what the meaning
of the word "is" is
V. Making the second best of it: Can Ecolawgic enhance environmental
regulation in the real world?
Conclusion: The barbariansare not all on the other side

Ecosystems cannot be hanned but only changed.'
Considering these and many other major and still growing impacts of
human activities on earth and atmosphere, and at all, including global,
scales, it seems to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central
role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to use the tenn
"anthropocene" for the current geological epoch.2
Introduction
The imperative of addressing global climate change in the Anthropocene
epoch calls for a systematic and scalable response. The critical question,
however, is what that response should optimally look like. Should it be
bottom-up and based on the so-called "wisdom of the crowd," as U.S.
environmental law scholar and former head of Connecticut's Department
of Energy and Environmental Protection Daniel Esty argues? 3 Is the best
1.

Bruce Pardy, Ecolawgic: The Logic ofEcosystems and the Rule ofLaw (Kingston, ON: Fifth

Forum Press, 2015) at 57. Pardy also acknowledges, however, that "[o]nly human beings have been
able to monopolize ecosystems" (ibid at 28).
2.
Paul J. Crutzen& Eugene F Stoermer, "The 'Anthropocene"' (2000) 41 Global Change Newsletter
17 at 17. See also Colin N Waters et al, "The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically
distinct from the Holocene" (2016) 351 Science 137; Damian Carrington, "The Anthropocene
epoch: scientists declare dawn of human-influenced age," The Guardian (29 August 2016), online:
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urgegeological-congress-human-impact-earth>.
3.
See, e.g., Daniel C Esty, "Bottom-Up Climate Fix," The New York Times (21 September
2014), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bottom-up-climate-fix.html>. See also
Daniel C Esty, "Regulatory Transformation: Lessons from Connecticut's Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection" (2016) 76:3 Public Administration Rev 403; Beth Simone Noveck, Wiki
Government: How Technology Can Make GovernmentBetter, DemocracyStronger and Citizens More

Powerful (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).
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approach, rather than bottom-up, polycentric?' Should we simply let the
market decide, as most economists and public policy pundits suggest?'
Or is there still a role for the regulations and policies of nation-states?
Notably, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik argues that global climate
change places green industrial policy-i.e., economic development based
on the sustainable use of non-renewable resources that fully internalizes
environmental costs-squarely on the policy agenda of governments.6 But
Rodrik also candidly concedes that "industrial policy has a very chequered
history."
In Ecolawgic: The Logic of Ecosystems and the Rule of Law,'
Canadian environmental and libertarian law scholar Bruce Pardy pushes
this caveat one step further, arguing that "[g]overnment policies are not
able to dictate how ecosystems or markets work. The notion of prescribing
particular ecological or economic ends conflicts with the natural behaviour
of these systems and their immutable rules."9 Pardy argues instead for an
environmental law regime modeled on the logic of ecosystems and the
natural right to autonomy. In particular, Pardy proposes an "ecolawgic":
a "manifesto for ecosystems, markets and the rule of law that reconciles
individual autonomy, free markets and environmental protection.""o
How to resolve this tension in modem environmental governance,
which Pardy rightly characterizes as being torn between laissez-faire
supporters of so-called free markets and market-based instruments,
and statists advocating for various forms of government intervention
to correct market failures?"1 Part I of this article briefly summarizes the
core elements of Pardy's proposed Ecolawgic and its critique of liberal,

4.
Elinor Ostrom, "A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change" (2009) World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 5095.
5.
See, e.g., Terry L Anderson & Donald R Leal, Free Market Environmentalism (New York:
Palgrave, 2001). But see Noah Smith, "Economists Are Out of Touch With Climate Change,"
Bloomberg Vew (14 March 2016), online: <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-03-14/
economists-are-out-of-touch-with-climate-change>.
6.
Dani Rodrik, "Green industrial policy" (2014) 30:3 Oxford Rev of Economic Policy 469 at
472 [Rodrik, "Green industrial policy"]. See also Dani Rodrik, "Roepke Lecture in Economic
Geography-Who Needs the Nation-State?" (2012) 89:1 Economic Geography 1 at 11-12, 16.
7.
Rodrik, "Green industrial policy," supra note 6 at 472.
8.
Pardy, supra note 1.
9.
Ibid at ii.
10. Ibid at iii.
11. Ibid at i. This tension may be characterized much more broadly as a tension in modem governance
writ large. For over two hundred years, liberals in the classical sense have argued that individuals
ought to be trusted to make their own decisions. Regulators, on the other hand, increasingly want to
protect individuals from themselves. For an overview of how this tension continues to shape debates
over the nature and extent of public governance and regulation, see, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, Simpler:
The Future of Government (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
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instrumental government regulation of the environment. Part II critically
responds to the first core principle of Pardy's model-"the right to
autonomy in ecosystems" 1 2-by drawing on a broad variety of sources and
perspectives to illustrate how individual autonomy is not natural but rather
historically contingent and normative. Individual autonomy, far from
being a constitutive element of the state of nature, is but one normative
principle competing among a rich array of cultural values, means, and
ends.1 3 Moreover, autonomy is not the antithesis of regulation, but rather a
product of regulation. Part III proceeds by critically responding to Pardy's
second core contention, that markets are spontaneously self-organizing
and naturally self-correcting. By drawing on institutionalist approaches
to economics, Part III argues that the critical question is not whether to
regulate the environment and correct market failures, but how. Part IV
extends the institutionalist approach to rules and regulations in order to
critically examine Pardy's related argument that a dynamic ecosystem
model of law is capable of establishing an internally coherent and objective
rule of law, not only for environmental law, but also for law generally. Part
V shifts from critique to critical reconstruction, and argues that Pardy's
ambitious argument not only incites a reconsideration of the liberal
legal theory of environmental regulation, but that it also suggests ways
in which environmental regulations may be significantly enhanced. The
article concludes by arguing for a pragmatic counter-proposal in the form
of a pluralist, polycentric model of environmental regulation and policy
that is capable of, if not fully reconciling, then at least accommodating
individual autonomy, free-ish markets, and environmental stewardship
in the Anthropocene. Autonomy in the Anthropocene depends, not on
deregulation, but on the ability of governments to provide equal and
meaningful opportunities for the public to participate in environmental
governance aimed at fashioning a collective future.
I.

The logic ofEcolawgic
Entire books could be written about the techniques of rulemaking....
Surprisingly, and perhaps disturbingly, very few such books have in fact
been written. Maybe it is thought that such things are self-evident,
but they are not."

12. Ibid at iii.
13. David Matless, "Climate change stories and the Anthroposcenic" (2016) 6 Nature Climate
Change 118.
14.

Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introductionto LegalReasoning (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 202, n 25.
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It is important to signal at the outset that Pardy's argument is not
only directed at environmental law, but at contemporary law and liberal
legal theory generally. "Modem legal regimes," argues Pardy, "do not
respect how ecosystems and markets operate, but ecosystems and markets
can provide insight about how the law should work."" Pardy's target is
instrumentalist, ad hoc legal decision-making writ large, and his admirably
ambitious aim is to reform the law as a system of rule-based governance.
This article concentrates specifically on the implications of Pardy's
argument for environmental law and policymaking, both to narrow the
scope of Pardy's provocative challenge to contemporary legal decisionmaking and theory, and to focus on what is arguably the world's most
pressing legal and public policy problem-environmental stewardship in

the Anthropocene.

16

Pardy argues that much contemporary law-be it the product of
legislation or adjudication-is founded on morality, utilitarian costbenefit analysis, claims about the public interest, or even natural law. He
contends that the official force of the state is used to enforce subjective
preferences, be they the instrumentalist priorities of decision-makers or
the particular versions of the law taken for granted by decision-makers
as natural, right, and good." The result, Pardy claims, is the arbitrary use
of state power to pursue particular ends and the repeated imposition of
one group's preferences and priorities over those of others-the familiar
allegory of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Against this state of affairs, Pardy
15. Pardy, supra note 1 at ii.
16. This article's focus on the environmental law implications of Pardy's proposed Ecolawgic is
also warranted by the fact that much of Pardy's scholarship, out of which Ecolawgic arises, concerns
environmental law. See e.g. Bruce Pardy, "The Logic of Ecosystems: Capitalism, Rights, and the Law
of 'Ecosystem Services"' (2014) 5 J Human Rights & Environment 136; Bruce Pardy, "Towards and
Environmental Rule of Law" (2014) 17 Asia Pac J of Envtl L 163; Bruce Pardy, "Eviscerating Property
in the Name of Sustainability" (2012) 3 J Human Rights & Environment 292; Bruce Pardy, "The Dark
Irony of International Water Rights" (2011) 28 Pace Envtl L Rev 907; Bruce Pardy, "Environmental
Assessment and Three Ways Not to Do Environmental Law" (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 139; Bruce
Pardy, "The Hand is Invisible, Nature Knows Best, and Justice is Blind: Markets, Ecosystems, Legal
Instrumentalism and the Natural Law of Systems" (2009) 44 Tulsa U 67; Bruce Pardy, "The PardyRuhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part V: Discretion, Complex-Adaptive Problem Solving,
and the Rule of Law" (2008) 25 Pace Envtl L Rev 341; Bruce Pardy, "Goods, Services and Systems: A
Review of Ruhl, Kant & Lant's The Law and Policy ofEcosystem Services" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall

U 445; Bruce Pardy, "Environmental Law and the Paradox of Ecological Citizenship: The Case for
Environmental Libertarianism" (2006) 33 Environments 25; Bruce Pardy, "Ecosystem Management
in Question: A Reply to Ruhl" (2006) Pace Envtl L Rev 209; and Bruce Pardy, "In Search of the Holy
Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem" (2005) 1:1 JSDLP 29 [Pardy, "In Search
of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law"].
17. Pardy, supra note 1 at 13. For an internal judicial analysis of legal incoherence, see David
Stratas, "The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency"
(2016) Social Science Research Network, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2733751>.

284

The Dalhousie Law Journal

seeks to justify the application and force of law on the basis of "standards
that are naturally unassailable, objectively true, and independent of human
preference.""
Enter ecosystems and markets. Pardy characterizes ecosystems as
"intangible systems producing patterns and outcomes" which operate
"according to their own immutable characteristics and rules."1 9 For
Pardy, the logic of ecosystems runs as follows: "competition for scarce
resources leads to natural selection, where those organisms better adapted
to ecosystem conditions survive and reproduce, leading to evolutionary
change. All participants are equally subject to their forces; systems do not
playfavourites. "20
Similarly, in Pardy's view markets are also dynamic systems. Like
ecosystems, he argues, markets "operate according to their own immutable
characteristics and rules."2 1 Moreover, markets "arise spontaneously
whenever people think they will be better off by trading."2 2 While Pardy
concedes that "[1]aws and governments can make markets more stable and
efficient, such as by enforcing contracts and creating a supply of money,"
he nonetheless maintains that laws and governments "create neither the
activity of trading nor the market dynamics that the transactions create."2 3
Indeed, Pardy argues that markets "share the logic of ecosystems." 24
Markets, he argues, share the same characteristics and principles that
"drive the logic of competitive selection." 25 These characteristics include
(1) resource scarcity, where supply is insufficient to meet demand; (2) the
constitutive relationship of supply and demand; (3) naturally autonomous
individuals, whereby sellers and buyers "make their own self-interested
choices about what to sell and buy, and at what price"; (4) the pursuit
of self-interest, subject to monopolistic forces ("Only human beings have
been able to monopolize ecosystems" 26 ); (5) survival of the fittest via
adaptation, specialization, and efficiency; (6) diversification and resilience
ansing out of competition; (7) failure as a normal and necessary event; 27
(8) dynamic stability and self-correcting mechanisms: whereas "failures
of organisms and enterprises are necessary events, failure of the system

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Pardy, supra note 1 at 14.
Ibid at 16 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 18 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 22 [emphasis added].
Ibid.
Ibid. I will return to this "concession" (as I characterize it) below.
Ibid at 25.
Ibid.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid.
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itself is not"2 8 because of the effects of positive and negative feedback
loops, which effectively limit the misallocation of scarce resources; and
(9) non-linear systems in non-equilibrium, where continuous, nonlinear,
and unpredictable change is the rule. 2 9 Pardy concludes his comparison of
ecosystems and markets thus:
Ecosystems and markets arise spontaneously. They are not created or
invented by human design. They operate according to their own rules,
which cannot be changed by government decree. Ecosystems and
markets may be interfered with, but the nature of their processes cannot
be altered. These systems are not just collections of things. They consist
of relationships and interactions that express information and produce
outcomes. They are organic and evolutionary, changing through time.
These systems reflect their own logic. The idea of dictating ecological or
economic results is inconsistent with the way they behave.30
So much, then, for green industrial policy. Never mind sustainable
development.
But that is not the end of it. Pardy extends his argument beyond
market regulation to regulation and the rule of law writ large. Pardy draws
on long-standing characterizations of the Western legal tradition as being
awkwardly composed of both the rule of law-the foundational principle
that government officials and citizens are obligated to abide by a regime of
legal rules-and instrumentalism, the equally foundational if irreconcilable
principle that the law is a means to an end, an instrument for the public
good.3 1 Pardy's point is that the rule of law and legal instrumentalism
are mutually antagonistic, and the clash between the two "prevents law
28. Ibid at 31.
29. Ibid at 33-35.
30. Ibid at 35.
31. Ibid at 50, quoting Brian Tamanaha, "How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of
Law" (2007) 56:2 Depaul LR 469 at 469-470. Interestingly, however, Pardy merely asserts rather
than demonstrates his claim that instrumentalism is pervasive in contemporary legal decision-making.
In Thinking Like a Lawyer, Schauer argues just the opposite. For Schauer, what is pervasive is not
instrumentalism, but formalism: "the pervasive formality of the law-its tendency to take its rules and
their words seriously even though in some cases they might work an injustice-is what distinguishes
law from many other decision-making contexts" (supra note 14 at 33). Legal philosopher Ronald
Dworkin, by contrast, argued that principled (as opposite to formalistic) decision-making was highly
typical of American legal decision-making. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977) and Ronald Dworkin, Law s Empire (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Or it could be that while most legal rules are relatively clear,
most reported decisions involve disputes about the fringes rather than the core of legal rules, and that
this selection effect skews legal analysis and doctrine in the direction of instrumentalism. See, e.g.,
George L Priest & William Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation" (1984) 13 J Leg Stud 1.
The resolution of this discrepancy, which is interpretive and empirical nature, is beyond the scope of
this article. For further discussion, see the Symposium: Developing Best Practicesfor LegalAnalysis
(6-7 May 2016) 84:1 U Chicago L Rev. This is a critically important area for future research.
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from operating as a system-dispassionate, impersonal, objective, and
consistent."32
Instead, Pardy argues that law should operate as a system, in particular
a system closely resembling ecosystems and markets. Pardy puts it this
way:
Law is a system too. Its abstract features should resemble those of
ecosystems and markets: generally applicable rules and principles,
intrinsic neutrality, and internal coherence and integrity. The mandate of
decision-makers is not to "do right" but instead to "let the system speak."
People make their own decisions and craft their own survival strategies
based on the generally applicable framework that the law provides, and
they are allowed to succeed or fail on the basis of those strategies. Their
actions and decisions contribute to markets and ecosystems, and their
aggregate effects make those systems what they are.33
This is, to be sure, a novel application of systems thinking to law. How,
for instance, are decision-makers-judges, legislators, administratorssupposed to "let the system speak"? Pardy ups the ante:
Like ecosystems and markets, the law should be internally coherent.
Every rule and principle should be connected. Every decision should
be related to all others. Within a properly constituted legal system,
there is an answer for every dispute that arises. Such a system treats its
participants dispassionately and equally, subjecting all to the same rules.
Systems do not playfavourites.34
Pardy's Ecolawgic makes a novel contribution to the ongoing-and
seemingly interminable-debate about the ideal conceptualization of the
relationship obtaining among state, market, and society.3 5 In proposing
a model of law-making premised on the supposedly neutral, systemic
properties of ecosystems and markets, Pardy seeks an objectively true and
fair method for resolving the fundamental questions at stake in democratic
politics: What interests are at stake? Who speaks for whom? How to
balance efficiency and fairness? Who decides?
It is important to acknowledge, however, that laissez-faire models of
governance (ofwhich Ecolawgic is a novel variant) are not alone in seeking
32. Pardy, supra note 1 at 51.
33. Ibid at 112.
34. Ibid at 112 [emphasis added].
35. For a useful overview of this debate, see K Sabeel Rahman, "Conceptualizing the Economic
Role of the State: Laissez-Faire, Technocracy, and the Democratic Alternative" (2011) 43:2 Polity
264 [Rahman, "Economic Role of the State"]; for a more technical account, see K Sabeel Rahman,
"Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and Institutional Experimentation in the
2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes" (2011) 48 Harv J onLegis 555 [Rahman, "Envisioning
the Regulatory State"].
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neutrality and fairness in decision-making. Technocratic approaches
to economic regulation ever since Keynes, for example, have sought
and continue to seek out neutral, objective, and rational mechanisms of
governance.3 6 On this view, regulatory authority and expertise are capable
of promoting the public good while preventing regulatory capture (i.e.,
rent-seeking, or gaming the system) and substantive incompetence and
ineffectiveness.3 7 Notably, both the technocratic and the laissez-faire
paradigms have been criticized for failing to fully excavate the normative
presuppositions underlying their prescriptions: in the case of technocratic
managerialism there is the largely unexamined assumption that regulatory
means and ends can be neatly compartmentalized and cordoned off from
special interest politics, and normative priors;3 8 in the case of laissez-faire
market models, there is oft-asserted but less often-if ever-established
argument that markets are governed by "natural" laws.3 9 Part II below
critically examines the latter assumption and the role that it plays in
Pardy's Ecolawgic.40
II. The trouble with the principle ofautonomy, or why nature needs no
manifesto
Law is concerned with freedom, the worthiest and holiest thing in man,
the thing man must know if it is to have obligatory force for him."
The trouble with principle, according to literary and legal theorist
Stanley Fish, is that it does not exist.4 2 Fish argues that abstract principles
such as fairness, impartiality, mutual respect, and reasonableness cannot be

36. See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren" in John
Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963) 358. For an illustration of
how Keynesian thought continues to inform debates about the meaning and determinants of good
governance, see, e.g., Aziz Rana, "Obama and the New Age of Reform" (2009) 16:2 Constellations
271.
37. Rodrik, "Green industrial policy," supra note 6; Rahman, "Envisioning the Regulatory State,"
supra note 35.

38. For an extended discussion of the way that means and ends mutually inform one another, see
Michael C Dorf & Charles Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism" (1998) 98:2
Colum L Rev 267.
39. Rahman, "Economic Role of the State," supra note 35 at 277, drawing on Karl Polanyi, The
Great Transformation: The PoliticalandEconomic Originsof Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001

[1944]). Arguably, both the technocratic and the laissez-faire paradigms greatly overestimate the
rationality of decision-makers and individual market participants.
40. The assumption of rational decision-makers and economic managers will be addressed below in
Part V.
41. Georg WF Hegel, The PhilosophyofRight, translated by TM Knox (London: Clarendon Press,
1952 [1820]) at §216.
42. Stanley Fish, The Trouble With Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at
2.
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defined in ways that are not always already captured by a prior normative
agenda. Any attempt to furnish abstract principles with specific content
always and necessarily proceeds from unexamined presumptions about
what is good, just, normal, and natural. For Fish, the trouble with principle
is that the work supposedly performed by principles is really performed
by underlying and unacknowledged presumptions.43 The standard move,
he argues, "is to turn historically saturated situations into situations fully
detached from any specific historical circumstances and then conclude
that a proposed policy either follows from this carefully emptied context
or is barred by it.""4 Fish sets out the logic of this move:
A neutral principle that facilitates the forgetting of history is repeating
the forgetting that allowed it to emerge as a neutral principle. Neutral
principles, if they are to deserve the name, must be presented as if they
came first, as if they were before history, even if the inhabitants of history
were slow to recognize them. A neutral principle, in short, can have a
historical habitation but not a historical cause. Accordingly, the question
one asks of it is analytic ("What is its essence?") rather than genealogical
("Where did it come from?"). But once the genealogical question is
put and the principle is given a biography, the idea of regarding it as
neutral-as without reference to substantive imperatives-will seem
less compelling."
A classic example of this move is the trial court decision in the U.S. case of
Lochner v. New York.46 In Lochner, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
New York's Bakeshop Act of 1895, a statute that included a maximumhours requirement for workers in the baking industry and established
minimum conditions for plumbing, flooring, product storage, and
sanitation. According to U.S. constitutional law scholar Frederick Schauer,
Peckham J.'s conclusion in Lochner that the principle of "liberty" in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution naturally included the
freedom of a bakery employee to agree-free from state interference-to
work over 60 hours a week and over 10 hours per day was premised on the
assumption that no other meaning of "liberty" was possible. For Schauer,
Peckham J.'s reasoning, while ostensibly based on the plain and ordinary
43.

Ibid at 3.

44. Ibid at 4. For what is arguably the foundational defence of abstract, neutral principles, see
Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73:1 Harv L Rev 1.
45. Fish, supra note 423 at 6 [emphasis original]. Neutral, abstract principles have often been
criticized as offering a "view from nowhere." In the context of US environmental law, for example,
the recourse to abstract and neutral economic concepts is critically examined by Douglas A Kysar,
Regulatingfrom Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2010).
46. Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) at 64.
47. Schauer, supra note 14 at 30.
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meaning of the word "liberty," was actually based on a tacit public policy
choice." "When legal decision-makers like Peckham J., who are actually
(and perhaps, in this case, necessarily) making a policy or political choice
act as if there were no choice to be made," argues Schauer, they "act as
if it is the form that matters, but in fact it is the substance that is doing
the work."4 9 This is the trouble with principle-its tacit, unexamined
substantive (political) baggage.o
A critical precondition-and
unexamined
presumption-of
Pardy's Ecolawgic is the natural right to autonomy in ecosystems and
markets: "Autonomous behaviour is the main ingredient of markets
and ecosystems[... ]Human beings are part of nature when they are one
of many competing species in an ecosystem-the ecological equivalent
of one of the many buyers and sellers in a competitive marketplace." 1
And competition, argues Pardy, "is a neutral, impersonal dynamic which
arises from the autonomous pursuit of self-interest in an environment of
scarcity, driving selection and adaptation." 5 2 While Pardy simultaneously
acknowledges that the "right to personal autonomy has a long and rich
history in common law jurisdictions,"5 3 Pardy nonetheless presumes that
the right to autonomy is natural, prior to, and independent of any system
of law or morality. Law can either recognize or ignore this natural right,
either respect it or interfere with it. For Pardy, negative rights respect the
natural right of autonomy, whereas positive rights-whereby governments
redistribute resources-"are inconsistent with self-regulating systems and
48. Ibid. For example, Lawrence Lessig argues that the Supreme Court interpreted the purpose of the
statute, not as concerning the health of overworked bakers, which was how New York State defended
its legislation, but as benefitting labour at the expense of capital. According to Lessig, the Court ruled
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited any such redistributive taking from Peter to give to Paul.
See Lawrence Lessig, "Democracy After Citizens United," Boston Review (September/October 2010),
online: <http://new.bostonreview.net/BR35.5/lessig.php>. While Lochner has long been considered
wrongly decided, some see a possible resurgence of Lochner as a means of constitutionalizing negative
rights to economic liberty. See, e.g., Timothy K Kuhner, "Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence:
The Resurgence of Economic Theory" (2011) 18:3 Va J Soc Pol'y & L 395 at 398-401; Jedediah
Purdy, "Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy" (2014) 77:4 Law & Contemp
Probs 195; Thomas B Colby & Peter J Smith, "The Return of Lochner" (2015) 100:3 Cornell L Rev
527.
49.

Ibid.

50. In this sense, Fish's account of the trouble with principle closely tracks Lon Fuller's response to
HLA Hart's positivist argument in favour of the objective interpretation of legal rules in their famous
exchange in the pages of the HarvardLaw Review. Fish appears to agree with Fuller that the plain
meaning of the words used in a legal rule can never produce a clear outcome absent close attention to
the purpose underlying the rule. See Lon L Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to the Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart" (1958) 71:4 Harv L Rev 630, replying to HLAHart, "Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals" (1958) 71:4 Harv L Rev 593.
51. Pardy, supra note 1 at 54, 58-59.
52. Ibidat 55.
53.

Ibid.
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autonomous individuals."" On this view, private property rights "are a
corollary of individual autonomy."" The essence of individual autonomy
derives, not from a given "right to be wrong," but rather "from the reality
that, when it comes to the self-interest of the individual, no one else has
the knowledge, perspective or authority to define what 'wrong' means."56
Thus does Pardy's Ecolawgic depend on the presumption of a natural
right of individual autonomy, a right given, not by history or circumstance,
not by political process or regulation, but by nature itself This is a
powerful and, if accurate, compelling claim. But what if the answer to
Pardy's analytic question about the essence of autonomy is refrained, to
adapt Fish's argument about the trouble with principle, as a question about
the historical and normative genealogy of individual autonomy?" What
if, in other words, the individual and the right to individual autonomy
are human inventions-social constructions-rather than the products of
evolution and natural selection?
This is precisely the question pursued in Larry Siedentop's magisterial
account of the cultural origins of western liberalism.59 At the core of socalled "ancient" thinking, whether in the domestic sphere or in public life,
Siedentop argues that the Greeks and Romans did not subscribe to the
norm of individual autonomy. "Rather, they instinctively saw a hierarchy
or pyramid."60 The ancient view of reality did not include naturally free
and autonomous individuals flourishing or failing by dint of their own
choices. The norm of individual autonomy originates, not out of a primeval
state of nature, but rather from the origins of Christianity, particularly the
foundational teachings of St. Paul.61 "Let it be known to you, therefore, my
54. Ibid at 74.
55. Ibid at 56.
56. Ibid at 71.
57. For example, natural rights and canon law historian Brian Tiemey observes that the idea of
subjective rights has become central to our political discourse, but we still have no idea of the origin
and early development of the idea. Brian Tiemey, The Idea ofNaturalRights (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm
B Eerdmans, 1997).
58. David Kennedy, in examining the contested nature of economic, political, and legal expertise,
argues that the common tendency in debates over expertise is "to frame positions and projects as
expressions of a universal rather than a particular interest." Kennedy approaches the construction
of expertise about global law and policy by "stepping back from this kind of model.. to resist the
temptation to treat the hegemonic outcomes of past struggle as a fixed terrain for new engagements."
David Kennedy, A World ofStruggle: How Power Law, and Expertise Shape GlobalPoliticalEconomy

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016) at7.
59.

Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Individualism (New York:

Penguin Books, 2015).
60. Ibid at 51. See also Benjamin Constant, "On the Liberty of the Ancients compared to that of the
Modems" in Benjamin Constant, PoliticalWritings, BiancamariaFontana, ed (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) 309.
61. Ibid at 58. See also Acts, 13:38-39 (NRSV), quoted.
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brothers," Paul reportedly preached, "that through this man forgiveness
of sin is proclaimed by you; by this Jesus everyone who believes is set
free...."62 According to Siedentop, "Paul's conception of the Christ
overturns the assumption on which ancient thinking had hitherto rested,
the assumption of natural inequality."6 3 Paul's vision on the road to
Damascus "amounted to the discovery of human freedom-of a moral
agency potentially available to each and everyone, that is, to individuals."6 4
Paul's radical interpretation of the meaning of Jesus, in Siedentop's view,
"introduced to the world a new picture of reality. It provided an ontological
foundation for 'the individual', through the promise that humans have
access to the deepest reality as individuals rather than merely as members
of a group."6
How did Paul accomplish this radical ontological shift? The premise
of Paul's argument-the moral equality of individuals-requires a human
will that is pre-social and thus removed from conventional social roles,
categories, and unequal statuses in the then-obtaining social division
of labour.6 6 The problem with this conceptual move, however, is that if
thought depends on language, and if language is a social institution, how
then can individual agency and equality have a pre-social foundation?
Paul's answer, according to Siedentop, was a leap of faith in the Christ,
which requires "seeing oneself in others and others in oneself."6 7 For Paul,
human autonomy is paradoxically realized through submission to the
mind and will of God as revealed in the Christ, and that act of submission
constitutes a "new creation."6 8 Siedentop concludes his account of Paul's
radical thinking thus:
So in Paul's writings we see the emergence of a new sense of justice,
founded on the assumption of moral equality rather than on natuml
inequality. Justice now speaks to an upright will, rather than describing
a situation where everything is in its 'proper' or fated place. Paul's
conception of the Christ exalts the freedom and power of human agency,
when rightly directed. In his vision of Jesus, Paul discovered a moral
reality which enabled him to lay the foundation for a new, universal
social role.69
62. Ibid at 59-60.
63. Ibid [emphasis added].
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid at 63. This is not to suggest, however, that Paul's was an atomized model of society. Rather,
he argued for a voluntary instead of a coercive basis of human associationj oined by a common belief:
ibid at 62. See also Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in ClassicalAntiquity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1982) at 10-19.
66. Ibidat6l,63.
67. Ibid at 65.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid at 66.
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In other words, Paul effected the very move identified by Fish above
by purposefully forgetting the anistocratic assumptions about the proper
ordering of society in antiquity in order to construct a new essence-"a
new, universal social role"-for human beings as equal, autonomous,
and individual "children of God." Whereas in the Hellenistic period
philosophers began to conceive of a universal or "human" nature precisely
to legitimize their own rational superiority, Paul's conception was
fundamentally subversive."
Substantive and political differences aside, however, the process
underlying each move is precisely the same, and that process of forgetting
and reconceiving remains the principal way knowledge is unmade and
remade. As Kennedy describes his analytically analogous research into the
making of global political economy and expert knowledge, "I am interested
in the way experts forget their struggles and their role in distribution to
celebrate their knowledge as universal, their world as ordered, their path
aligned with progress."n
Siedentop's genealogy of western liberalism proceeds by tracing
the cultural contestation and construction of individualism through the
development of the Christian church and the adoption of Christianity in
the Roman empire to the development of monasticism, to the ideas and
profound influence of Augustine, and finally to the relationship between
this new conception of human freedom and questions of church and state
governance and law, including so-called barbarian codes, Roman law,
and Christian institutions. While it is well beyond the scope of this article
to fully retrace Siedentop's fascinating history of western liberalism,
Siedentop's closely related and counter-intuitive account of the connection
of Christianity, the state, and the market merits a brief discussion.

70. Ibid at 46. Even if Siedentop is wrong about Paul's contribution, he is wrong in an interesting and
instructive way. Contemporary appeals to "ancient" culture and thought are fraught with ideological
tension. As emerging work in classical reception studies suggests, the dialogue between the so-called
ancient past and contemporary politics tends to continuously modify both concepts in ways that are
difficult to discern See, e.g., Barbara Goff & Miriam Leonard, "Introduction: The Legacy of Greek
Political Thought" (2016) 8:1 Classical Reception Journal 1.
71. Kennedy, supra note 58 at 5. The remainder of Kennedy's point merits quotation in full:
Modem expertise knows and it forgets-or refuses to know-its powers and its limits.
When they forget-and we forget-it becomes all the more difficult to understand how
this world, with all its injustice and suffering, has been made and reproduced. And more
difficult to identify levers of change or experience the place we stand as a fulcrum of
possibility. The result of continuous struggle is an eerie stability it is hard to imagine
challenging or changing.
As Siedentop observes, so entrenched was the ancient assumption of natural human inequality as
the organizing norm of religious belief, the family, and government that it took centuries to displace:
Siedentop, supra note 59 at 177.
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Siedentop recounts the adaptation and modification of Roman law in
the creation of a new canon law to undergird a centralized papal rule in
Europe. The opening words of Gratian's Decretum in or around the year
1140 illustrate the place of moral equality in canon law: "Natural law [us]
is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel by which each is to do
to another what he wants done to himself and forbidden to do to another
what he does not want done to himself"7 2 This conception upended the
assumptions about social role and status embedded in Roman law dating
back to antiquity. For example, the second-century Roman jurist Gaius set
out a three-part test to establish personal status: Is the person (1) free or
unfree? (2) a citizen or foreign-bom? (3) a paterfamilias or in the power of
an ancestor?7 3 Canon law reversed these assumptions, and the consequences
were far-reaching. According to Siedentop: "This shift away from the
assumptions of the ancient world gave birth to the idea of sovereignty. By
making the individual the unit of legal subjection-through the stipulation
of 'equal subjection'-the papal claim of sovereignty prepared the way for
the emergence of the state as a distinctive form of government."1 4
Near the end of his account, Siedentop asks rhetorically why any of
this matters. His answer: "It reveals how Christian moral intuitions played
a pivotal role in shaping the discourse that gave rise to modem liberalism
and secularism."" For Siedentop, the developments ofthe sixteenth through
the nineteenth centuries mirror-and are made possible by-the evolution
of canon law from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. The sequence begins
with the insistence on the equality of individual status, followed by the
assertion of a range of basic individual human rights, and concluding
with claims for self-government. The crucial difference between the two
periods-and this is particularly significant for our purposes here-is that
eighteenth-century philosophers "denatured God and deified nature."7 6
The basis for the claim to individual liberty became-and still remains"human nature."
For Siedentop, it is no mere coincidence that in English and French
historical dictionaries the words "individual" and "state" (as sovereign
authority) arise at aboutthe same time." Theirmeanings are interdependent:

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Decretum of Gratian Part 1: D1 c 1, quoted in Siedentop, ibid at 216.
Ibid at 217.
Ibid at 219.
Ibid at 359.
Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers(1932), quoted ibid.
Siedentop, supra note 59 at 359.
Ibid at 347.
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"It was through the creation of states that the individual was invented."79
As the next part of this article attempts to show, much the same can be said
about so-called "free markets." As Siedentop suggests, "[i]t should not
come as a surprise, therefore, that we often find the motives and actions
of Europeans by the fifteenth century easier to understand-more familiar
and more 'modem'. The kind of means/ends rationality or thinking that we
associate with market relations was emerging clearly."so
Before proceeding, however, a brief word about "nature" is in order.
The title of this part is "The Trouble With the Principle of Autonomy,
or Why Nature Needs No Manifesto." The trouble with the principle of
autonomy as the defining feature of the human nature undergirding Pardy's
Ecolawgic is that it does not exist. Autonomy is constructed, contingent,
and continuously contested. It cannot do the work that Pardy's proposal
requires. To foreshadow one of the conclusions reached below, this renders
Pardy's Ecolawgic yet another form of proposed reregulation based on
largely tacit assumptions about what is "good, moral, and desirable,"" not
a principled basis for deregulation.
But what of "nature"? While it can be argued that "nature" is as much a
social construction as is the "individual,"8 2 the point here is different. Pardy
argues that ecosystems operate according to their own immutable ruleswhile they can be interfered with, the nature of their processes cannot be
altered.8 3 Bracketing for now whether the emergence of the Anthropocene
epoch is fatal to this line of reasoning, the point is twofold. First, on
Pardy's account, nature just is. Accordingly, nature needs no manifesto.
But no such claim can be made for human nature or human autonomy.
Autonomy is invented, not natural; it needs a manifesto. Several, actually:
Paul's letters are but one example, although an extraordinarily influential
one. Second, manifestos arguing for, or premised on, individual autonomy
(including Ecolawgic) are, and will always be, on an equal ontological
playing field with other manifestos arguing for a different vision of the
law and the appropriate balancing of private and public interests (e.g., the
controversial Leap Manifesto 4 ). No manifesto, however, can legitimately
decide the debate in advance by claiming to be objectively preferable
because objectively natural and true. That is not principle; that is politics.
79. Ibid [emphasis added].
80. Ibid.
81. Pardy, supra note 1 at 109.
82. See, e.g., Andrea Wulf, The Invention of Nature:Alexander Von Humboldts New World (New
York: Knopf, 2015); Aaron Sachs, The Humboldt Current: Nineteenth-Century Exploration and the
Roots ofAmerican Environmentalism (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
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Pardy, supra note 1 at 109.
The Leap Manifesto, online: <leapmanifesto.org>.
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But it is politics in the very best sense of the term: "the art of expanding
the possible.""
III. "I'vefound aflaw ": The myth of naturallyfree and self-correcting
markets
Yes, I've found a flaw. I don't know how significant or permanent it is. But
I've been very distressed by that fact.86

For Pardy, markets-like ecosystems-aise naturally and ought not be
interfered with. The idea of dictating ecological or economic outcomes
is inconsistent with the way ecosystems and markets behave." This is a
complex claim and needs to be unpacked.
The first part of Pardy's claim is that markets are not made; they
anse spontaneously. Pardy offers no evidence, however, to corroborate
this proposition, which is manifestly inaccurate. Governments, after all,
make markets all the time. Recently, for instance, the Ontario provincial
government joined a greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade market,
the Western Carbon Initiative, a market created by the governments of
California and Quebec." Even more recently, the provincial governments
of Ontario and Quebec "signed an agreement with the Mexican government
to jointly develop carbon markets with the aim of allowing companies in
those provinces to purchase Mexican greenhouse-gas-reduction credits to
satisfy provincially regulated emission caps."89
More generally, only the crudest, simplest forms of exchange can be
accurately described as arising spontaneously. While it is true that exchange
relationships will arise in almost all communities, what distinguishes
modem economies is the refinement and systemic complexity of their
market structures. Several state initiatives have enabled modem markets

85. I owe this formulation to Andrew Coyne, "Harper exit, above all, brings relief," NationalPost
(31 May 2016) A4 [emphasis added].
86. PBS News Hour, "Greenspan Admits to 'Flaw' to Congress, Predicts More Economic Problems,"
PBS News Hour (10 October 2008), online: <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business-july-decO8crisishearing_10-23.html>; see also Edmund L Andrews, "Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,"
The New York Times (23 October 2008), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/
economy/24panel.html?_r-0>.
87. Pardy, supra note 1 at 35.
88. Jason MacLean, "Ontario's cap-and-trade regime off to a shaky start," Toronto Star (3 March
2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/03/03/ontarios-cap-and-traderegime-off-to-a-shaky-start.html>.
89. Shawn McCarthy, "Ontario, Quebec sign climate policy deal with Mexico," The Globe and Mail
(1 September 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/internationalbusiness/latin-american-business/ontario-quebec-sign-climate-policy-deal-with-mexico/
article31637425/>.
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to develop beyond barter exchange. Such initiatives include the publicly
subsidized creation of courts of law (and later administrative agencies and
tribunals) to judicially enforce contracts and nonpossessory interests in
personal property, the sovereign grant of corporate status to encourage the
pooling of capital, and the creation and control of currency (legal tender).90
"Government regulation here not only facilitates market freedom, it helps
create it." 9 1 The same is true for the institution of property. As Bentham
famously observed: "Property and law are born together, and die together.
Before laws were made, there was no property; take away laws, and
property ceases." 92
To see why this is so, it is again useful to frame the question in
terms of genealogy rather than essence. Private property as we presently
understand it is the result, not of any form of deregulation, but of regulation
that redistributed the property rights of feudal lords to their tenants.93
As is well known, soon after being crowned king in 1066, William the
Conqueror (also known as the Bastard) dispossessed most of the English
lords, claimed ownership of the whole of England, and parceled out rights
to pieces of it to his trusted allies in return for obligations to provide him
knights to defend the realm. His allies, the new lords, in turn subinfeudated
by making arrangements with tenants (sublords, or vassals) who would
provide the services the new lords required in exchange for access to
land. Vassals then secured tenants of their own (peasants), who lived
and worked on the land with the assistance of serfs (villeins), who were
unfree (slaves).94 Under feudalism, there was neither complete nor private
ownership of land; nor was there anything remotely like the modem
conception of individual autonomy (other than for William the Bastard,
that is). Instead, feudalism comprised multiple pledges of fealty-tenants
pledged fealty to lords; lords pledged fealty to the Crown.95
Over time, however, the political power of the lords increased; the
council of lords became Parliament, and King John was forced to sign

See Roderick A Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation by Regulations" in I Bernier

&

90.

A Lajoie, eds, Regulations, Crown Corporationsand Administrative Tribunals (Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 1985) 81 at 115 [Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation"]; see also Joseph William
Singer, No Freedom Without Regulation: The Hidden Lessons of the Subprime Crisis (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 2015).
91. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulations," supra note 90 at 115 [emphasis added].
92. Jeremy Bentham, Theory ofLegislation (1840), quoted in Singer, supra note 90 at 15.
93. My account here borrows liberally from the historical account provided by Singer, supra note 90
at 32-44.
94. Ibid at 32-33; see also David Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery: The Penguin History of
Britain 1066-1284 (London: Penguin Books, 2013) at 84-85, 403-406.
95. Singer, supra note 90 at 33.
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the Magna Carta.9 6 At the same time, the property rights of lords also
diminished. With the development of the common law, the royal courts
began to recognize and protect the property rights of the lords' tenants.9 7
As Singer concludes, "[p]easants gained both property and freedom not
by deregulation; they gained independence by regulatory limitation on the
powers of landlords and redistribution of property rights from lords to
tenants."98
Like Siedentop, Singer asks rhetorically why any ofthis history matters
to us today. His answer: "Freedom is not possible without regulation, and
markets cannot exist without law. The free market is based not on a lack
of government regulation but on a regulatory principle that abolishes
feudalism and promotes individual choice within the bounds of law." 9 9
Singer proceeds to put an even finer point on the issue:
A democratic society recognizes each person as free and equal. Such
societies do not emerge from a state of nature. They are born from
struggles to limit the power of kings and lords and to free slaves and
servants from their masters. History teaches us that this can be achieved
only by regulating the terms of contractual and property arrangements to
abolish feudal and slave relationships and to spread access to property
and opportunity.'o
Libertarian legal theorists are not anarchists; they recognize the necessity
of law, and Pardy is no exception. But Pardy's Ecolawgic rests on a
common, tacit, and ultimately false dichotomy between legitimate laws
necessary for the existence of markets, on the one hand, and illegitimate
measures seeking to regulate the effectiveness and redistribute the fruits
of markets on the other."'o This false dichotomy rests on top of yet another
untenable distinction, between freedom and order.10 2 As Singer puts it (in
the American political context): "Conservatives use the word 'regulation'
to mean 'bad laws.' . . Conservatives tend to use the word 'regulation'
only for laws they dislike. When conservatives want regulation, they
96. Ibid at 34.
97. Ibid. As Siedentop recounts, the condition of labour under feudalism (as opposed to slavery
during antiquity) was marked by the nascent belief that there were limits to the rightful power of one
man over another. "There was an opening, however slight, for a private sphere and for freedom. It is
probably no coincidence that the tenth century also saw the stirrings of a market economy": Siedentop,
supra note 59 at 181-182.
98. Ibid at 35. Singer proceeds to recount how the process unfolded, mutatis mutandis, in the
American colonies, including the legislative abolition of fee tail ownership.
99. Ibid at 44.
100. Ibid at 56.
101. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 115-116.
102. Ibid at 116; see also Bernard E Harcourt, The Illusion ofFree Markets: Punishment and the Myth
ofNatural Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) at 18, 44-45, 52.
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tend to justify it by calling it something other than "regulation." They
may call it 'preventing fraud,' 'enforcing contracts,' 'protecting property
rights,' or 'promoting the rule of law."'1 0 3 But, as Macdonald observed
in respect of the Canadian regulatory context, those who assert the
distinction between state endeavours as legitimate structural market
preconditions versus inappropriate regulatory interventions "have never
succeeded in providing a criterion" capable of justifying it.o' Hence the
recourse to the "state of nature," or the free market as part of a "natural
order." As Bernard Harcourt observes in his fascinating comparison of
the Parisian police des grains-"the intricate and extensive web of royal
decrees and ordinances that governed every aspect of the commerce of
grain under the ancien regime""o'-and the present-day Chicago Board
of Trade, the idea of a naturally free, efficient, and self-correcting market
naturalizes and masks the market rules and regulations that actually exist.
According to Harcourt: "This, in turn, effectively keeps us from making
the connection between the different methods of organizing markets and
their distributive consequences, and from fully assessing the justice of the
resulting outcomes."1 0 6 And this, in yet another turn, makes it difficult if
not impossible to frame the question of regulation, not in terms of whether
to regulate (including whether to regulate markets), but how to determine
which regulations are required to address a given policy problem.10 7 That
is the question taken up by the next part of this article regarding the rule
of environmental law.
Before proceeding, however, there is the small matter of the infamous
"flaw" of free market ideology. In the midst of the subprime mortgage
crisis in 2008, Alan Greenspan testified before Congress. Greenspan, of
course, had long and famously argued that markets work well-indeed
work best-in the absence of regulation, and that regulations designed
to cure market imperfections are worse than the disease. Representative
Henry Waxman put it to Greenspan that this was the reason that Greenspan
had refused in his capacity as the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve to
"prevent irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime crisis." 0 s
Greenspan admitted that there was a "flaw" in the free market model that
he had long used to define "how the world works."1 0 9 Crucially, Greenspan

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Singer, supra note 90 at 8, 12.
Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 116.
Harcourt, supra note 102 at 6.
Ibid at 52.
Singer, supra note 90 at 8; Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 146.
PBS New Hour, "Greenspan Admits Flaw," supra note 86.
Ibid.

Autonomy in the Anthropocene? Libertarianism, Liberalism,
and the Legal Theory of Environmental Regulation

299

further admitted that he now understood that free markets have limitations
and that regulations may be required to prevent future catastrophic market
failures.110
More recently, in a provocative and extraordinarily candid paper
entitled "Neoliberalism: Oversold?," 111 three members of the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) Research Department identified yet another
flaw in the free market model: its core promise of increasing economic
growth. The IMF authors describe the free market (or "neoliberal")
paradigm as being based on two main planks: (1) increased competition
achieved through deregulation and the opening up of domestic markets,
and (2) a smaller role for the state achieved through privatization and
limits on governments' ability to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt.11 2
They proceed to analyze the performance of these two policy planks
by examining the effects of two more specific policies: (1) removing
restrictions on the movement of capital across borders ("capital account
liberalization"); and (2) fiscal consolidation, or policies that reduce deficits
and debts ("austerity").1 1 3
Regarding cross-border flows of capital, the IMF authors conclude
that the relative weighting of costs and benefits depends on the type of flow
(e.g., long-term versus short-term) but "may also depend on the nature of
supporting institutions and policies.""' Regarding austerity measures, the
authors observe that "the need for consolidation in some countries does
not mean all countries-at least in this case, caution about 'one size fits
all' seems completely warranted."" The underlying lesson here is that the
idea of a single, paradigmatic, and naturally free market model is more
myth than reality. (This point and its positive implications are explored
further in Part V below.)
Overall, the IMF authors reach what they call "three disquieting
conclusions" about the purported benefits of the neoliberal agenda.1 1 6

110. Ibid. Of course, Greenspan's admission unwittingly discloses yet another flaw, the idea that
markets can function-much less exist-absent regulations: Singer, supra note 90 at 5. Even liberal
economists like Joseph Stiglitz commit the conceptual error of distinguishing markets and regulations.
Commenting on the economic success of Chile, for instance, Stiglitz noted that the country is "an
example of a success of combining markets with appropriate regulation." Joseph Stiglitz, "The Chilean
Miracle: Combining Markets with Appropriate Reform" (2002) Commanding Heights interview,
online: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/intjosephstiglitz.html#4>.
111. JonathanD Ostry, PrakashLoungani & Davide Furceri, "Neoliberalism: Oversold?" (2016) 53:2
Finance & Development 38, online: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm>.
112. Ibid at 38.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid at 39.
115. Ibid at 40.
116. Ibid at 39.
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First, when looking at a broad group of countries, the expected benefits of
economic growth are "difficult to establish.""' Second, "the costs in terms
of increased inequality are prominent."" And third, increased inequality
"hurts the level and sustainability of growth." 119 'In sum," they conclude,
"the benefits of some policies that are an important part of the neoliberal
agenda appear to have been somewhat overplayed." 12 0 Accordingly, and
not a little astonishingly, given the source, the IMF authors counsel that
"in some cases the untoward distributional consequences will have to be
remedied after they occur by using taxes and government spending to
redistribute income. Fortunately, the fear that such policies will themselves
necessarily hurt growth is unfounded."1 2 1
Remarkable as these findings are, although remarkable only because
of their source, they should not be surprising. As Macdonald observed over
thirty years ago, the "free market" is simply another regulatory choice.1 22
Therefore, the "flaw" identified by Greenspan and the IMF was the flaw of
imagining that "free markets" operate outside of regulatory frameworks,
and then paying insufficient attention to the design and effectiveness of
those frameworks. Because markets are not natural phenomena, so-called
deregulation is essentially "reregulation where the delegates of regulatory
power (the holders of publicly created and protected property rights) are
not subjected to due process controls over the exercise of their delegated
discretion... .Most deregulation is nothing more than reregulation without
a democratic face."1 2 3 Accordingly, "free market" governance should alarm
libertarian legal theorists like Pardy and anyone else concerned about the
integrity of the rule of law just as much as other government regulations
117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid at 40.

121. Ibid at 41 [emphasis added]; see also Jonathan D Ostry, "We Do Not Have to Live With the
Scourge of Inequality," Financial Times (3 March 2014), online: <https://www.ft.com/content/
f551b3b0-a0b0-11e3-a72c-00144feab7de>. Pardy's analysis is subject to the same correction.
Pardy argues, for example, that "[w]hen environmental quality is cast as a public good, government
paradoxically becomes the sole source of protection and the leading source of trouble" (Pardy, supra
note 1 at 106). Pardy's argument is empirically unsubstantiated. While assessing the costs and benefits
of regulation is notoriously difficult, there exists evidence suggesting that major environmental
protection legislation more than pays for itself. For example, the US EPA estimates that the annual
costs of the 1990 amendments to the Clean AirAct will reach US$65 billionby the year 2020. But the
EPA also estimates that by 2020 those amendments will save 230,000 adult deaths from particulate
pollution and prevent 5.4 million lost school days and 17 million lost workdays per year. In all, peerreviewed analysis estimates the benefits in the year 2020 to be US$2 trillion, exceeding the costs
estimate by a ratio of 30 to 1. See Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the
CleanAirAct from 1990 to 2020 (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency, 2011).
122. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 146.
123. Ibid at 146, 136.
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do.1 24 This raises the question, raised anew in the Anthropocene epoch,
about the meaning of the rule of raw and its relationship to environmental
regulations.
IV. What is the rule of environmental law? It depends on what the
meaning of the word "is" is
In modem discussions of governmental regulatory activity, probably the
most praised, most maligned and most misunderstood conception is that of
the Rule of Law.'25
Singer argues that another word for "law" is "regulation," and "regulation"
is simply another word for "the rule of law." 12 6 On the classic Diceyan
formulation, the rule of law entails the following three principles:
(1) legislative legitimation, (2) judicial independence, and (3) executive
minimalism. 1 27 These principles are founded on three corresponding
assumptions: (la) the law is primarily a static common law, and that
any legal change must occur by means of a specified legal form that is
individually normative (i.e., justifiable by an appeal to corrective justice)
rather than institutionally normative (i.e., justifiable by an appeal to
redistributive justice); (2a) law is distinct from politics, and must remain
so-the objectivity of law is maintained by filtering all questions of policy
into prescriptive legislation enacted by Parliament and applied impartially
and mechanistically by courts; and (3a) unfettered Parliamentary
supremacy. 128 These aspirations of a highly formal and explicit rule of law,
finally, are operationalized through rules that are general, abstract, stable,
prospective, publicly announced, and internally coherent. 129
How does this classic formulation of the rule of law relate to the ideal
form and substance of environmental regulations in the Anthropocene?
Recall that for Pardy, the rule of law is composed of "[g]enerally applicable,
abstract rules and limited state discretion... In this way, legal disputes are

124. Macdonald puts the issue this way: "deregulation consists of expanding rather than contracting
the scope of uncontrolled regulatory discretion by substituting property owners for state officials as
titularies of delegated power, and by deploying the market, as opposed to formalized administrative
procedures, as a regulatory process" (ibid at 128). For an analysis of how manipulation and deception
are shot through supposedly free markets (i.e., insufficiently and improperly regulated markets),
see George A Akerlof & Robert J Shiller, Phishingfor Phools: The Economics ofManipulation and
Deception (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
125. Ibid at 117.
126. Singer, supra note 90 at 2.
127. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 117; see also Harry Arthurs,
"Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid at 120.
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insulated from individualized notions ofjustice and from the politicization
of law." 130
Modem environmental law, argues Pardy, respects neither the logic
of ecosystems and markets nor the rule of law. Rather, "[i]t is a policydriven, intensely political phenomenon."131 To illustrate his critique, Pardy
conjures a hypothetical regulatory standard issued under an imaginary
statute.132 He asks us to assume that the statute's purpose is to "prohibit
pollution that harms the environment and endangers human health"; the
statute's standard restricts the concentration of substance X in effluent to
.02 micrograms per litre.133
How was the standard established? Pardy offers a possible explanation
through an imagined cross-examination of the regulator. There are three
key moments in Pardy's fictional exchange. The first unfolds as follows:
Q: So you still haven't answered the question: why at this particular
number?
A: We judged that the benefits of lowering the number from .02ug/1 in
terms of likelihood of adverse effect and magnitude of that effect did
not justify the additional burdens of achieving the lower standard.
Q: Burdens on whom?
A: The regulated industries.
Q: So you are measuring the difficulty in complying with a more
onerous standard?
A: Yes.' 34
This moment illustrates a crucial and unavoidable aspect of accountable
environmental law making: weighing and comparing the benefits and
costs of regulatory compliance. Ideally, this is done on the basis of the best
available independent science. It is difficult to imagine an environmental
regulation that ignores compliance costs, or one that is established on the
basis of unproven benefits, as being considered democratically legitimate,
particularly in the case of an institutionally normative regulation such

130. Pardy, supra note 1 at 8-9. More recently, Pardy defined the concept as "the proposition that no
office or officers are above the law and are not empowered to make it up as they go": Bruce Pardy,
"The Unbearable License of Being the Executive: A Response to Stacey's Permanent Environmental
Emergency" (2015) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 1029 [Pardy, "The Unbearable Licence of Being the
Executive"]; see also Jocelyn Stacey, "The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion
in Environmental Law" (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 985 [Stacey, "The Environmental Emergency"];
Jocelyn Stacey, "The Promise of the Rule of (Environmental) Law: A Reply to Pardy's Unbearable
License" (2016) 53:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 681 [Stacey, "The Promise of the Rule of (Environmental)
Law"].

131.
132.
133.
134.

Ibid at 105.
Ibid at 92-97.
Ibid at 92.
Ibid at 93.
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as the one featured in Pardy's hypothetical, which clearly contemplates
redistribution. Indeed, this was a critical threshold issue in several U.S.
states' challenge to the U.S. E.P.A.'s "clean power rule"1 3 5 enacted
under the Clean Air Act.13 6 The E.P.A. deemed power-plant regulation
"appropriate" because the plants' carbon emissions pose risks to human
health and the environment. But even under the remarkably deferential
standard of review of agency decisions under U.S. administrative law,13 7
the Supreme Court held that the E.P.A. erred in failing to consider the costs
of regulatory compliance as part of its determination of the appropriateness
of the regulation.1 3 8
The second key moment in Pardy's imagined cross-examination

unfolds like this:

Q: And you have factored in the effects of synergistic and cumulative
effects of other toxic substances that might be in the water?
A: To the best of our ability.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: It is impossible to know conclusively all the other substances that
might be present in all the bodies of water to which the standard
applies.
Q: Then how do you draw the line?
A: We gather as much information as we can about other suspected
hazardous substances.1 39
This moment discloses both a fair question and an honest (if hypothetical)
answer, and yields at least two important lessons, the first specific and
the second more general. Specifically, cumulative effects assessment is
notoriously complex and, as currently practiced, decidedly suboptimal.
The Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment recently defined
a cumulative effect as "a change in the environment caused by multiple
interactions among human activities and natural processes that accumulate
across time and space."140 According to a recent review of cumulative
effects assessment (CEA) in Canada, "meaningful CEA requires much

135. Michigan vEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,576 US _ (2015).

136. CleanAir Act, 42 USC §7401 et seq (1970).
137. Known as "Chevron deference," for the decision of Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984).

138. The rule has been remanded to the Environmental Protection Agency for correction.
139. Pardy, supra note 1 at 95-96.
140. Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canada-wide Definitions and Principles

for Cumulative Effects (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2014), online: <http://
www.ccme.ca>.
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more than just good science.""' Instead, effective CEA requires a mindset
capable of examining environmental impacts through the following three
lenses: (1) technical, (2) law and policy, and (3) public-participatory. 14 2
Moreover, the "CEA mindset cannot just be legislated-legislation will
just help to guide and encourage thinking toward the mindset by attending
to what has been agreed to be important-but the mindset itself is an ethos
of CEA that all engaged in CEA processes must embrace."143
More generally, scientific certainty cannot be a precondition for
regulating behaviour in order to protect human health and the environment.
One need not accept the validity ofthe precautionary principle, for example,
in order to accept that regulatory decisions and actions are frequently if not
almost always made in a context of epistemic uncertainty. Which leads to
the third key moment in Pardy's imagined exchange:
Q: I would be hard pressed to state the general rule you have followed
to develop the standard for substance X.
A: There is no general rule. Context is everything.
Q: But there must be a common set of criteria, or a standard definition
for environmental harm that you use each time.
A: It doesn't work that way. We can't define it, but we know it when we
see it.",

Here, Pardy implies that standards are derived from rules, preferably
general and stable rules. But rules and standards do not necessarily exist in
such a derivative, hierarchical relationship. They are better understood as
two different and sometimes competingforms of legal norms.'
What is the relevant legal norm at play in Pardy's hypothetical? He
does not identify it explicitly, but it emerges implicitly in the imagined
exchange as being sustainability, or socially inclusive and environmentally
sustainable economic growth.146 Sustainable economic development,
particularly in the context of climate change and the Anthropocene, is an
example par excellence of a complex, superwicked public policy problem

141. A John Sinclair, Meinhard Doelle & Peter N Duinker, "Looking Up, Down, and Sideways:
Reconceiving Cumulative Effects Assessment as a Mindset" (2016) 62 Environmental Impact
Assessment Rev 183.
142. Ibid. The third-i.e., public-participatory-lens is critical. I will return to this perspective as a
matter of general, democratic principle in the next section of this article.
143. Ibid.
144. Pardy, supra note 1 at 97.
145. See, e.g., Pierre J Schlag, "Rules and Standards" (1985) 33:2 UCLAL Rev 379.
146. This is the formulation of Jeffrey D Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2015) at 3.
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that resists resolution because of its "enormous interdependencies,
uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders.""'
Given this normative objective, how should the norm itself be
formulated: in the form of a general and stable rule, or as a standard,
which allows for a greater range of regulatory choice and discretion
within a set of mandatory considerations?... Macdonald argued that rules
are not a particularly appropriate mechanism where indeterminate and
variable policy objectives are to be pursued, for their efficacy depends on
their relative permanence, stability and generality."1 4 9 U.S. legal theorist
Lawrence Solum similarly characterizes the choice this way: "Some
decisions involve very complex judgment calls that involve the application
of multiple and incommensurable factors to particular situations that are
highly variegated or even unique. This is a situation where rules are unlikely
to work well, and therefore standards or discretion seems appropriate."150
In closing his hypothetical cross-examination Pardy adapts the
observation of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who famously
remarked that when it came to defining obscenity, "I know it when I see
it." 51 No doubt Pardy ends with this flourish to put a fine point on the
objectionable nature of discretionary decision-making. But the flourish
fails. There is a kind of wisdom, easily recognized if not easily defined
(we know it when we see it) in Stewart J.'s reasoning, based as it was
on considerable judicial experience. What if the anonymous regulator in
Pardy's hypothetical possesses great experience and practical wisdom
when it comes to the administration of environmental protection standards?
Would that change the way we read the exchange? Would it change the
way we value the virtues of the Diceyan conception of the rule of law?
Consider Schauer's take on the value of the rule of law in the real world:
Of course, we do not live in Plato's utopia, and thus we understand that
the values of legal reasoning and the Rule of Law may serve important
goals in constraining the actions of leaders lacking the benign wisdom of
Plato's hypothetical philosopher-kings. But even when we leave Plato's
utopia and find ourselves in the real world with real leaders and their real
flaws, the same dilemma persists. Legal reasoning in particular and the
Rule of Law in general will often serve as an impediment to wise policies
and to the sound discretion ofenlightened, even ifnot perfect, leaders.'52
147. Richard Lazarus, "Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1153 at 1159 [Lazarus, "Super Wicked Problems"].
148. I owe this formulation of a legal standard to U.S. legal theorist Lawrence B Solum, "Legal Theory
Lexicon," online: Legal Theory Blog <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheorylexicon/2004/03/
legal theoryle_3.html> [Solum, "Legal Theory Lexicon"].
149. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulations," supra note 90 at 141.
150. Solum, "Legal Theory Lexicon," supra note 148.
151. Jacobellisv Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964), Stewart J concurring.
152. Schauer, supra note 14 at 12 [emphasis added].
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Applied specifically to sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs argues that "[c]omplex
systems require a certain complexity of thinking as well. It is a mistake to
believe that the world's sustainable development problems can be boiled
down to one idea or one solution."1 5 3 A skilled sustainable development
practitioner, Sachs imagines, must be capable of "acknowledging the
complexity of the issues and looking to make a specific diagnosis of each
specific case.""'
Pardy anticipates this line of counter-argument and calls it "arbitrary
law and lazy science."1"' He argues that "[1]egal decisions of all kinds
are frequently made in the face of scientific and evidential uncertainty
by applying abstract rules and principles."1 5 6 However, Pardy offers no
particular real-world examples of abstract, general, and relatively stable
rules that have in fact succeeded both in respecting the logic of ecosystems
and in protecting them at the same time.
But what is most telling about Pardy's hypothetical-and libertarian
legal theory more generally-is not its intolerance of ad hoc, political
decision-making that is effectively above the law. That much is familiar
and a reasonable concern. Rather, it is the libertarian blind spot regarding
ad hoc, political interference in the very making of legislation in the first
place, before the law, as it were. Recall how Pardy sets up his hypothetical:
"Consider a hypothetical regulatory standard issued under an imaginary
statute.""' Following his cross-examination of the hypothetical regulator
tasked with administering this statutory standard, Pardy offers the
following closing argument: "Officials are willing to substitute their
own assessment of reasonable risk in place of the personal assessments
of the people who will be subjected to them. Such decisions belong to
autonomous individuals."158
We are given no details about the origins of the statute, why it was
enacted, or how it was conceived, drafted, and ultimately passed into law.
We have to assume, along classic Diceyan lines, that it is legislatively
legitimate. But then how can we fault the regulator in this hypothetical?
The regulator cannot be said to be an official "willing" to substitute his
or her own assessment of risk in place of the personal assessments of
the people subjected to them-the regulator must exercise judgment and

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Sachs, supra note 146 at 8.
Ibid.
Pardy, supra note 1 at 106.
Ibid.
Pardy, supra note 1 at 92.
Ibid at 97.
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discretion given the form and substance of the statutory standard enacted
by the legislature that the regulator is duty-bound to follow.
Now, is there any reason to suspect that the statutory standard itself,
and not the regulatory judgment and discretion it necessitates, may not
reflect "the personal assessments of the people who will be subjected" to
the risks that the statute seeks to address? Well yes, actually. Earlier in the
hypothetical cross-examination, there is a further telling exchange:

Q: So if the cost of compliance is very high, the standard becomes less
onerous than it would have been?
A: Well, no, not necessarily. This industry is particularly fragile. And
the government has spent many resources trying to develop it."'
This smacks, not only of regulatory complexity, but also of regulatory
capture, or "the result or process by which regulation, in law or application,
is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and
toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent or action of
the industry itself"16 0 The phenomenon of regulatory capture and the
political interference of market advocates and participants it represents
is rarely if ever acknowledged by libertarian and rule of law critiques of
legal decision-making, which tend to focus on the application of legal
rules rather than their formulation in the first place. Indeed, in an earlier
analysis, Pardy proposed a single rule to guide environmental law, which
he formulated "apart from the issue of political feasibility," arguing
"[t]hat there is little point in lamenting political obstacles [to environmental
law reform] if, should those obstacles disappear, there is no ready-made
legal approach that is capable of achieving the environmental goals that so
many espouse."161
What is this single rule of environmental law? Pardy formulates it as
follows:
No one may produce environmental impact that, if multiplied by the
number of humans in the ecosystem, would cause a permanent ecosystem
change, unless a larger encompassing ecosystem can be identified in
which no permanent change would result from the impact multiplied by
the number of humans in that larger system.1 62

159. Ibid at 94.
160. Daniel Carpenter & David A Moss, eds, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest

Influence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 13. For an application
of regulatory capture to Canadian environmental law, see Jason MacLean, "Striking at the Root
Problem of Canadian Environmental Law: Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture" (2016) 29 J
Envtl L & Prac 111 [MacLean, "Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law"].
161. Pardy, "In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law," supra note 16 at 37-38 [emphasis
added].
162. Ibid at 50; see also Pardy, supra note 1 at 65.
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Of course it is possible to quibble with this rule: it is anthropocentric,
and yet it fails to recognize that when it comes to climate change in the
Anthropocene there is no other larger, encompassing ecosystem to move
to. But to Pardy's immense credit, this rule extends libertarian and rule of
law theorizing well beyond Morton Horwitz's still-resonant critique of the
rule of law as promoting "a consciousness that radically separates law from
politics, means from ends, processes from outcomes."1 6 3 Pardy's proposed
rule of environmental law-and his Ecolawgic more generally-attempts
to attend simultaneously to procedural and substantive (environmental)
justice, furnishing an important exception to the observation that "a
'legalist' consciousness that excludes 'result-oriented' jurisprudence
as contrary to the rule of law also inevitably discourages the pursuit of
substantive justice."1 6 4 This sets Pardy's Ecolawgic apart from the standard
line of libertarian legal theory.
Nevertheless, Pardy's general rule ignores "the question of limits for
corporations"1 6 5 and appears to fall under the spell of the "mythology in
which private power is benign, markets are efficient (and objective) arbiters
of exchange."1 6 6 After all, we all have blind spots and ideological priors.
Toward the end of Singer's No Freedom Without Regulation, for instance,
after attempting to reconcile liberal versus libertarian conceptualizations
of freedom and regulation, Singer admits that a close friend once gave him
a button that reads: "stubbornly clinging to utopian illusions."16 7
What is the ideal rule of environmental law, then? As the title of this
Part suggests, the answer depends on what the meaning of the word "is"
is. This is meant to suggest that legal rules are dynamic rather than static.
As Macdonald argued, law is always in the process of becoming itself. But
Macdonald himself was at times a utopian: "Law, like the state, is more
than a system of rules and offices. It is a symbol; it is an achievement
which reflects the aspirations of the society out of which it has arisen."1 6 8
Except, that is, when it reflects the conflicting interests of the society
out of which it has arisen. Pardy's Ecolawgic shares more with Singer's
and Macdonald's accounts than he might care to admit. Ecolawgic is an

163. Morton J Horwitz, "The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?" (1977) 86:3 Yale LJ 561
at 566.
164. Ibid.
165. Pardy, "In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law," supra note 16 at 53.
166. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 136. For example, not once in
Ecolawgic does Pardy acknowledge-let alone address-political rent-seeking on the part of market
participants. His critical gaze is cast solely on "the process of utilitarian, discretionary, case-by-case
decision making tightly held by politicalofficers": Pardy, supra note 1 at 107 [emphasis added].
167. Singer, supra note 90 at 179.
168. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 146.
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idealistic conception of what legal rules should optimally be, quite apart
from a pragmatic or political solution to real-world regulatory impasse.
The question, pursued in the next part of this article, is whether Pardy's
idealistic conception can enhance environmental regulation in the world
that we live in, or what economists like to call the world of the "second
best."169
V. Making the second best of it: Can Ecolawgic enhance environmental
regulationin the real world?
First we had market failure; so we tried regulating markets.
Then we had regulatory failure; so we tried reforming regulation;
Now, it seems, we have "reform failure."'
And so we tried reforming reform.' And we are still trying.17 2 Which
brings us to the key-if not entirely intended-contribution that Ecolawgic
has to make to the liberal legal theory of environmental regulation.
Pardy's Ecolawgic is an example par excellence of what is described
in economic theory as first-best thinking.1 7 3 First-best economic thinking
presumes both that it is possible to determine ex ante a unique set of
appropriate institutional arrangements, and that convergence toward
such arrangements is inherently ideal."' Leaving aside their supposed
naturalness, and bracketing markets' abundant flaws and failures, firstbest thinking in economics nonetheless presumes that markets are in fact
free, perfectly competitive, based on complete information, and free of
externalities and public goods. This state of affairs is typically expressed

169. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, "Second-Best Institutions" (2008) 98:2 American Economic Rev 100
[Rodrik, "Second-Best Institutions"]; Richard G Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory
of Second Best" (1956) 24:1 Review of Economic Studies 11 [Lipsey & Lancaster, "The General
Theory of Second Best"]. In the context of climate change policy, see Paul Krugman, "The Big Green
Test-Conservatives and Climate Change," The New York Times (22 June 2014), online: <http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion/paul-krugman-conservatives-and-climate change.html?_r-0>.
170. Colin S Diver, "Regulating the Regulators," Book Review of Reforming FederalRegulation by
Robert E Litan & William D Nordhans (1984) 132:5 U Pa L Rev 1234 at 1234.
171. See, e.g., Roderick A Macdonald, "Law Reform for Dummies (3rd Edition)" (2014) 51:3
Osgoode Hall LJ 859 [Macdonald, "Law Reform for Dummies"]; Roderick A Macdonald & Hoi
Kong, "Patchwork Law Reform: Your Idea is Good in Practice, but It Won't Work in Theory" (2006)
44:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 11.
172. See, e.g., K Sabeel Rahman, "Rethinking Regulation: Preventing capture and pioneering
democracy through regulatory reform," White Paper, April 2016, online: Roosevelt Institute <http://
rooseveltinstitute.org/rethinking-regulation/>.
173. The locus classicus of this view with respect to welfare economics is Kenneth J Arrow, "An
Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics" in J Newyman, ed, Proceedings
of the Second Berkeley Symposium on MathematicalStatistics and Probability (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1951) 507; see also Gerard Debreu, The Theory of Value (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1959).
174. Rodrik, "Second-Best Institutions," supra note 169 at 100.
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as "Pareto efficiency" and means that no one can be made better off (i.e.,
through regulation) without making someone else worse off (once again,
robbing Peter to pay Paul). As the locus classicus of this view readily
concedes, however, "the classical criteria in production and consumption,
have little relevance to the actual world.""' Or as Stiglitz more recently
put it: "whenever information is imperfect or markets incomplete-that is,
always-there is a presumption that markets are not (constrained) Pareto
efficient."1 7 6 Accordingly, Stiglitz concludes that "the notion that markets,
by themselves, lead to efficient outcomes has, today, no theoretical
justification: no one believes that the conditions under which that statement
is true are satisfied.""
Enter the theory of the second-best."1 7 So-called second best models
in economics recognize the real-world complications that betray the
fanciful assumptions of first-best, textbook models. Second-best models
are, as their name suggests, humbler about the claims economic models
can credibly make. These models acknowledge that economiesdeveloped and developing alike-are replete with market imperfections,
that questions of efficiency cannot be meaningfully distinguished
from questions of distributive justice, and that government regulatory
interventions can generate positive outcomes. 179 Because economists
working in this school of thought have abandoned the textbook models of
classical economic theory, they have an almost infinite variety of models
to deploy in addressing real-world public policy issues.so Economist
Larry Summers neatly expressed the difference between first-best and
second-best economic thinking in respect of an analysis of banking reform

in China:
Like experts in many fields who give policy advice, the authors show
a preference for first-best, textbook approaches to the problems in their
field, while leaving other messy objectives acknowledged but assigned

175. Arrow, supra note 173 at 509 [emphasis added].
176. Joseph E Stiglitz, "Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation" (2008) at
2, Columbia University Academic Commons, online: <http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Stiglitz
Principles of Regulation 2.pdf>
177. Ibid. See also Marc Blaug, "Competition as an end-state and competition as a process" in B
Curtis Easton & Richard G Harris, eds, Trade technology and economics: essays in honour ofRichard

G. Lipsey (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997) 241 at 255 (arguing that "these beautiful theorems are
mental exercises without the slightest possibility of ever being practically relevant").
178. See Lipsey & Lancaster, "The General Theory of the Second Best," supra note 169; see also
Richard G Lipsey, "Reflections on the general theory of second best at its golden jubilee" (2007) 14:4
International Tax and Public Finance 349 [Lipsey, "Reflections on the general theory of second best"].
179. Dani Rodrik, "Why do economists disagree?" (5 August 2007) Dani Rodriks weblog, (blog)
online: <http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani-rodriks weblog/2007/08/why-do-economis.html>.
180. Ibid.
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to others. In this way, they are much like those public finance economists
who oppose tax expenditures on principle, because they prefer direct
expenditure programs, but do not really analyze the various difficulties
with such programs; or like trade economists who know that the losers
from trade surges need to be protected but regard this as not a problem
for trade policy.'
According to The Economist, no less, "[t]he best policy-oriented
economists, both left and right, are second best economists in the sense
that they grasp the lessons of their fictions, but aim at truly feasible ideals,
not blackboard utopias."1 8 2 Or as Rodrik concludes, disagreements about
first-best and second-best models "are often grounded not in economics per
se, but in strongly held prior views about the world in which we live." 1 8 3
Pardy's conceptualization of the rule of law as a kind of ecological
system is legal theory's analogue to first-best welfare economics. Recall that
he argues that the law ought to operate as a system that closely resembles
the ecosystems and markets. As such, the law ought to be made up of
abstract and generally applicable rules and principles that are intrinsically
neutral and internally coherent." Decision-makers must not attempt to
"do right"; rather, their mandate must be to "let the system speak."" For
Pardy, "[e]very rule and principle should be connected. Every decision
should be related to all others."1 8 6 Thus constituted, the legal system treats
all its participants equally, "subjecting all to the same rules.""' Moreover,
decision-makers are equally constrained. "Under a systemic rule of law,
judges are constrained by the content of the statute, by the non-legislative
nature of their judicial role, by the decisions of courts interpreting the
same statute in previous cases, by the principles of statutory interpretation,
by the expectation that they will articulate reasons for the result that they
have reached, and by the availability of appeal to a higher court."" Thus
181. Lawrence Summers, quoted ibid.
182. The Economist, "Making the second best of it" (21 August 2007), Free Exchange (Blog), online:
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/08/making the second best of it>; for an
application of the theory of second best to climate change as a market failure, see "The way forward:
Second-best solutions," The Economist (28 November 2015), online: <http://www.economist.com/
news/special-report/21678959-if-best-method-tackling-climate-change-not-offer-try-something>.
183. Ibid. In the context of Canadian climate change policy, for example, Mark Jaccard argues that "[r]
ather than listen to those who ignore evidence, [Prime Minister] Trudeau should focus on developing
creative solutions in a second-best world." Mark Jaccard, "Want an effective climate policy? Heed
the evidence," Policy Options (2 February 2016), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/
february-2016/want-an-effective-climatepolicy-heed-the-evidence/>.
184. Pardy, supra note 1 at 112.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid at 84.
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does Pardy seek to justify the force of law on the basis of "standards that
are naturally unassailable, objectively true, and independent of human
preference."1 8 9 Legal rules, in other words, that have little resonance-let
alone relevance-in the real world.
Would that it were so simple. If the law were indeed so clear and
comprehensive, so precise and prescribed, there would be little need
for the exercise of interpretative creativity and discretion on the part of
decision-makers. This is precisely the form that Jeremy Bentham, for
example, believed the law should take. Were the law so, Bentham believed
that neither judges nor lawyers-whom Bentham referred to derisively as
"Judge and Co."-would be able to obstruct the operation of precise and
largely self-enforcing statutes for their own self-interested purposes.1 9 0
As Schauer argues, however, we now know just how wrong Bentham
was on this point.1 9 1 While detailed statutes have become the norm, so too
have the variegated practices of statutory interpretation. This, according to
Schauer, is largely due to the inescapable fact that "even the most precise
statute cannot come close to anticipating the complexities and fluidity of
modem life."1 92 Consequently, "detailed statutes have increased rather
than decreased the frequency of judicial intervention." 1 9 3
Moreover, as noted above, statutory law is very often a morass, not
only of complex details, but also of special and competing short-term
interests. In the context of U.S. environmental law, for example, Lazarus
notes that since the early 1990s the U.S. Congress has "essentially
abdicated its lawmaking responsibilities in environmental law." 1 94 Making
matters worse, Lazarus argues, is that when Congress does actually act
in respect of environmental protection it does so through "appropriation
bills: omnibus budget bills which can number in the thousands of pages....
It is the worst kind of lawmaking. The riders themselves invariably
represent short-term, impulsive interests rather than the application of
long-term perspective and expertise."1 95 Congress now passes almost no
coherent, comprehensive environmental legislation, and it displays no
189. Ibid at 14.
190. Jeremy Bentham, "A General View of a Complete Code of Laws" in John Bowring, ed, The
Works ofJeremy Bentham (1962 [1843]) at 3, 5.

191. Schauer, supra note 14 at 150.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid. Schauer's analysis cannot be easily dismissed by rule-of-law libertarians, for Schauer is
very much an advocate for the position that what is distinctive about legal rules and reasoning is the
law's tolerance of outcomes that are best for law as a system, as opposed to any particular dispute.
194. Richard J Lazarus, "Environmental Law at the Crossroads: Looking Back 25, Looking Forward
25" (2013) 2:2 Mich J Envtl & AdminL 267 at 272.
195. Ibid at 272-273. For an analysis of this phenomenon in the context of Canadian environmental
law, see MacLean, "Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law," supra note 160.
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ability to deliberate openly and systematically in response to changing
circumstances and new information.1 9 6 Not only does this regrettable
state of affairs undermine environmental protection, but it also belies the
legislative supremacy of environmental law, and the rule of law more
generally. On this view of lawmaking, the law is anything but systemic
and self-enforcing. It rather more resembles a maze.
Concentrating exclusively on the constrained and deferential role
of judges-which is a canonical aspect of rule-of-law theorizing-does
little to address this existential threat to the rule of law and democratic
accountability. Worse, it distracts legal and policy analyses from the causes
of this "worst form of lawmaking," which is largely the result of lobbying
activities on behalf of the market actors lionized-or simply left off the
hook-not only by libertarian theory, but much legal theory besides.1 9 7
As Lawrence Lessig frames the problem in the American context, "[o]ur
Congress is corrupt. It is obvious. Yet we ignore the obvious."198
We live in a manifestly second-best world rife with complexity,
competing interests, and corruption (both quid pro quo and systemic). 1 9 9
This is as inescapably true of law as it is of markets. This does not mean,
however, that Ecolawgic does not have an important contribution to make
to the improvement of environmental decision-making and policy-making.
On the contrary, Ecolawgic may be read as an application of the original
purpose of the general theory of second best. The original purpose of
second-best economic theory was not simply to oust the first-best models
of economics textbooks. As Lipsey reflected on second-best thinking 50
years after its initial articulation, he explained the purpose of second-best
thinking thus:
The upshot is that in practical situations, as opposed to theoretical
models, we do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for
achieving an economy-wide, first-best allocation of resources. Achieving
an economy-wide second-best optimum allocation looks even more
difficult than achieving the first best. Without a model of the economy s

196. Richard J Lazarus, "Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law" (2006) 94:3 Geo LJ 619 at 625-629.
197. See, e.g., Lee Drutman, The Business ofAmerica is Lobbying: How CorporationsBecame
Politicizedand PoliticsBecame More Corporate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

198. Lawrence Lessig, The USA is Lesterland (CreateSpace, 2014) at 29; see also Lawrence Lessig,
Republic, Lost: The Corruption ofEquality and the Steps to End it (New York: Twelve, 2015).
199. See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklins Snuff Box to

Citizens United (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); for an insider's analysis of the
Canadian context, see, e.g., Alison Loat & Michael MacMillan, Tragedy in the Commons: Former
Members Speak Out About Canada'sFailingDemocracy (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2014); see also
Donald Savoie, What is Government Good At? A Canadian Answer (Montreal: McGill-Queens

University Press, 2015) at 265-266.

314

The Dalhousie Law Journal

generalequilibrium that contains most let alone all ofthe above sources,
we cannotspecify the existing situationformally and so cannot calculate
the second-best optimum setting for any one source that is subject to
policy change. This is an important point since much of the literature
that is critical of second-best theory assumes that economists know a
distortion when they see one and know that the ideal policy is to remove
the distortion directly, something that is necessarily welfare-improving
only in the imaginary one-distortion world.20 0

First-best ideals can serve as parameters that guide the creation of feasible,
second-best rules, policies, and institutions. As Lipsey argues, useful
"piecemeal policy advising is not impossible."2 0 1 But neither can rules and
policies be determined "purely scientifically; instead it is an art, assisted
by good economics, both theoretical and empirical."2 0 2
Rodrik similarly concludes his trenchant insider critique of free market
economics and application of second-best thinking, Economic Rules: The
Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science,2 0 3 with a manifesto of sorts

("The Twenty Commandments"), which reads in relevant part as follows:
1.
2.

Economics is a collection of models; cherish their diversity.
It's a model, not the model.

5.

The world is (almost) always second best.

9. Efficiency is not everything.
10. Substituting your values for the public's is an abuse of your
expertise. 204

Ecolawgic can perform the same role in respect of environmental
rule-making and policy-making .205 Perhaps not entirely coincidentally,
Ecolawgic also concludes with a manifesto. 20 6 Though largely a concise
summary of the book's principal arguments, Pardy's Ecolawgic manifesto
can also be read as a series of ideal rule-of-law design parameters capable

200. Lipsey, "Reflections on the general theory of second best," supranote 178 at 355-356 [emphasis
added].
201. Ibidat362.
202. Ibid.
203. Dani Rodrik, Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the DismalScience (New York: WW

Norton & Co., 2015).
204. Ibid at 213-214.
205. For a related account of the potential of institutional design to articulate how the common law
constitutional conception of the rule of law can be fulfilled in environmental law, see Stacey, "The
Environmental Emergency," supra note 130; but see in direct response Pardy, "The Unbearable
License of Being," supra note 130; regarding the rule of law as itself aspirational, see Stacey, "The
Promise of the Rule of (Environmental) Law," supra note 130 at n 59.
206. Pardy, supra note 1 at 109-112.
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of assessing and enhancing-if not creating 2 0 7-environmental rules and
policies.
Pardy argues, for example, that markets and ecosystems "consist
of relationships and interactions that express information and produce
outcomes."2 0 8 Markets and ecosystems are made up of complex, particular,
and piecemeal interactions. Accordingly, interventions in each can produce
unintended consequences. This does not, however, necessarily counsel
against such interventions, but it does effectively call for regulatory caution
and humility. Most environmental scholars accept, for instance, that the
principle of precaution has a role to play in standard setting.2 0 9 Pardy's
insight also effectively suggests that because attempts at making tradeoffs between competing interests and risks may be fraught with risks2 1 0
and uncertainties, rule-making and policy-making might better pursue
avoiding trade-offs altogether and treating them as a last resort. Avoiding
costly trade-offs, for example, is a defining element of Gibson, Doelle, and
Sinclair's proposal for a new, "next generation" environmental assessment
law that seeks to imagine, not the least bad economic activity in terms
of biophysical impacts, but rather the economic activity that makes a
net positive contribution to sustainability.2 1 1 While Pardy is critical of
environmental assessment generally, this "next generation" approach
respects the logic of ecosystems and markets while also recognizing that
intervention in each is inescapable.
Pardy proceeds to similarly observe that in both markets and
ecosystems, "the dynamics of the system arise from the interaction of
a multitude of individual actions, decisions and adaptations."2 1 2 This
insight recalls Macdonald's argument (discussed above) that "the sum
of regulation in any given economy is a constant; what vary are the
degree of centralization of regulation, and its instrumentalities."2 1 3

207. This is a critical caveat. I am ever mindful of Macdonald's warning against evaluating all forms
of regulation against a standard drawn from idealized conceptions lest such an evaluation give rise to
an artificial symmetry and simplicity. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 106.
208. Pardy, supra note 1 at 209.
209. See, e.g., David M Driesen, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can They
Be Reconciled?" (2013) 2013 Mich St L Rev 771 at 789.
210. Including so-called "risk/risk" dilemmas, whereby one environmental improvement-say, the
switch from coal to natural gas to lower carbon emissions-leads to other risks, including risks to
drinking water quality, methane emissions, and even earthquakes. See, e.g., William J Brady & James
P Crannell, "Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the
Federal Government and Varying State Regulations" (2012) 14:1 VJEL 39 at 42-43.
211. Robert Gibson, Meinhard Doelle & A John Sinclair, "Fulfilling the Promise: Basic Components
of Net Generation Environmental Assessment" (2015) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 257.
212. Pardy, supra note 1 at 110.
213. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation," supra note 90 at 145.

316

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Ecolawgic challenges the liberal legal theory of rule-making and policymaking by contending that liberal legal theory is neither democratically
accountable nor legitimate. But Pardy's own manifesto effectively (if not
expressly) calls for the same critical skepticism in respect of all forms of
decision-making, whether judicial, legislative, or delegated. Recall again
Macdonald's insight regarding markets and regulation: Because "markets
are not natural phenomena, deregulation is, in essence, reregulation
where the delegates of regulatory power (the holders of publicly created
and protected property rights) are not subjected to due process controls
over the exercise of their delegated discretion."2 1 4 Ecolawgic effectively
counsels in favour of examining all forms of discretionary rule-making and
decision-making-be it judicial, administrative, market-based, or some
combination of these 21 5 -against the stringent and aspirational principles
of the rule of law with the aim of enhancing democratic accountability
and legitimacy.21 6 Given the current federal government's aim of restoring
Canadians' trust in its environmental regulations, this is an urgent task for
environmental law and policy scholarship and practice.2 1 7
Pardy's Ecolawgic manifesto proceeds to valorize autonomy and
competition, arguing that autonomous individuals "are the elements of
markets and ecosystems" 21 8 and that the right to autonomy "includes the
right to participate in markets and ecosystems under conditions that exist

214. Ibid at 146 [emphasis added].
215. See, e.g., the federal government's decidedly mixed terms of reference for its review of the
federal environmental assessment regime, which include: (1) restoring "robust oversight and thorough
environmental assessments of areas under federal jurisdiction, while working with provinces and
territories to avoid duplication"; (2) ensuring "decisions are based on science, facts and evidence
and serve the public's interest"; (3) providing "ways for Canadians to express their views and
opportunities for experts to meaningfully participate"; and (4) requiring "project advocates to choose
the best technologies available to reduce environmental impacts." Government of Canada, "Review
of environmental assessment processes: Expert Panel Terms of Reference" (Ottawa, 2016), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews/
environmental-assessment-processes/final-terms-reference-ea.html>.
216. The present legitimacy crisis besetting the National Energy Board's assessment of TransCanada
Corp's proposed Energy East Pipeline is a case in point regarding the need for far greater accountability
in Canadian environmental administrative decision-making. See, e.g., Globe Editorial, "The National
Energy Board has a credibility issue it can no longer afford to ignore," The Globe andMail(29 August
2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/the-national-energy-board-hasa-credibility-issue-it-can-no-longer-ignore/article31599667/> [Globe Editorial, "The NEB has a
credibility issue"]; see also Campbell Clark, "NEB's missteps make Energy East a political problem
for Trudeau," The Globe and Mail (30 August 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/nebs-missteps-make-energy -east-a-political-problem-for-trudeau/article3 1601223/>
[Clark, "NEB's missteps"].
217. See, e.g., Jason MacLean, "How to restore trust in Canada's environmental regulations," Toronto
Star (23 June 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/06/23/how-torestore-trust-in-canadas-environmental-regulations.html>.
218. Pardy, supra note 1 at 110.
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independently of monopolistic or non-competitive forces, whether public
or private."2 19 As argued above in Part II, there is no such right that is not
granted by some sort of regulation in the first place, but Pardy's point here is
nonetheless instructive. Because regulatory processes themselves function
very much like markets with "invisible hands," law reform ought to pay
attention to stakeholders' ability to meaningfully access and influence rulemaking and policy-making processes otherwise marred by asymmetries
in information and influence.2 2 0 In the context of environmental policy
responsive to climate change, or what Rodrik terms "green industrial
policy,"2 2 1 a democratically accountable policy framework "lies between
arm's-length [competition] and capture... Government agencies need to
be embedded in, but not in bed with, business."2 2 2 There are a number
of regulatory design mechanisms capable of facilitating greater access to
and competition over rule-making and policy-making influence. These
mechanisms, in turn, reflect Ecolawgic's related call for systemic integrity,
fairness, and in effect transparency (i.e., decision-makers should "let the
system speak";22 3 "Systems do not play favourites"2 2 4 ). Such mechanism
include, but are not limited to, agency disclosure ofminutes ofmeetings with
firms and industry groups and periodic audits by independent experts.2 25
Better still, environmental rule-making and policy-making processes
ought to be opened up to a broader range of stakeholders and social actors,
and such pluralistic and polycentric processes should seek to balance these
stakeholders' participation against the participation and outsize influence
of the usual suspects (i.e., industry insiders).2 2 6 This recommendation best
represents the meaning of "autonomy in the Anthropocene" advanced in
this article-namely, the free and equally efficacious participation of the
public in regulatory processes that seek to enhance our freedom to fashion
a collective future in an existentially threatening epoch of our own making.

219. Ibid at 111.
220. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, "Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs:
Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation" in Carpenter & Moss, PreventingRegulatory Capture,
supra note 160 at 365.
221. Rodrik, "Green Industrial Policy," supra note 6.
222. Ibid at 485.
223. Pardy, supra note 1 at 112.
224. Ibid.
225. Rodrik, "Green Industrial Policy," supra note 6 at 488.
226. For a discussion of how this form of engagement might look in the context of a reformed
environmental assessment regime in Canada, for example, see Jason MacLean, Meinhard Doelle
& Chris Tollefson, "Polyjural and Polycentric Sustainability Assessment: A Once-In-A-Generation
Law Reform Opportunity," 30:1 J Envtl L & Prac 36 [MacLean, Doelle & Tollefson, "Polyjural and
Polycentric Sustainability Assessment"].
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This is not to suggest, however, that the legal foundations of a
more pluralist and polycentric environmental regulatory regime are
either different or unimportant. The familiar foundations of legitimacy,
transparency, and unbiased decision-making premised on evidence-based
and publicly-accessible reasoning will assume an even greater importance
in a more pluralist and polycentric regime. As Macdonald and Wolfe
observe in respect of pluralist social-ordering processes more generally,
"[p]olicing the boundaries of fairness in interaction and constraining
pathological disproportion of economic power in exchange will be even
more significant."2 2 7 Pardy's Ecolawgic can serve as a useful model for
establishing the ideal boundaries of fairness and equality in environmental
decision-making processes.
Finally, Pardy's Ecolawgic manifesto usefully reminds us that
"[1]ike ecosystems and markets, the law should be internally coherent."2 2 8
Internal legal coherence may well be impossible in the actual world, given
its complexity, fluidity, and future that we can at best only dimly perceive.
But coherence is nonetheless a worthy aspiration and a critical issue in
rule-making and policy-making processes.
Canada's intermittently halting and half-measured efforts to date to
establish a national climate change policy2 2 9 illustrate the importance of
foregrounding internal coherence. The absence of a coherent, national
climate change policy even at the late date of this writing has resulted
in an ineffective patchwork of subnational policies and regulations.2 3 0
An internally coherent policy must not only integrate a variety of extant
instruments-taxes, emissions trading schemes, energy-efficiency
regulations-across jurisdictions, it must also integrate Canada's efforts
to craft a sustainability strategy2 3 1 and implement the UN's Sustainable

227. Roderick A Macdonald & Robert Wolfe, "Canada's Third National Policy: The Epiphenomenal
or the Real Constitution?" (2009) 59 UTLJ 469 at 496.
228. Pardy, supra note 1 at 112.
229. See, e.g., Steven Bernstein et al., eds, A Globally Integrated Climate Policy for Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Meinhard Doelle, "The Legacy of the Climate Talks in
Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or Brokenhagen?" (2010) 4 Carbon & Climate L Rev 86.
230. See, e.g., Nathalie J Chalifour, "Climate Federalism-Parliament's Ample Constitutional
Authority to Regulate GHG Emissions" (2016) University of Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper
No 2016-18, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2775370>.
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Development Goals.2 32 While the paradigm of Canadian environmental
law and policy-notunlike U.S. environmental law and policy-is "messy,
pluralistic, and pragmatic,"2 3 3 it does not follow that environmental law's
pluralism cannot be made more pragmatic by aspiring toward greater
internal coherence and integration.2 3 4 Greater internal coherence may yield
greater external visibility and viability, particularly for the end-users of
environmental law and policy who are not fully comfortable with the rich
mess of its means/ends pluralism (e.g., judges, parliamentarians, prime
ministers, journalists, citizens).
Conclusion: The barbariansare not all on the other side
Under this rule, the following activities can be expected to be prohibited:
clear cutting, operating coal-fired generating stations and nuclear power
plants, driving petroleum powered automobiles, spraying pesticides,
growing genetically modified crops, operating fish farms, burying inorganic
waste, and numerous other everyday practices.235
The liberal legal theory of environmental regulation favouring regulation
aimed at facilitating sustainability cannot afford to be complacent. While
there is much to be said about the suitability of its messy, pragmatic
pluralism to our complex and fluid world, it is nonetheless true that other
approaches are capable of making compelling claims for political and
public support, including market-based approaches aspiring to accountable
and efficient least-cost solutions to environmental problems. Given the
superwicked nature of climate change and sustainability,2 3 6 environmental
law and policy cannot afford to close ranks or become close-minded.
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In the discipline of economics, Rodrik describes close-minded
theorizing as the "barbarians are only on one side" syndrome.237 According
to Rodrik, "[t]hose who want restrictions on markets are organized
lobbyists, rent-seeking cronies, and their ilk, while those who want freer
markets, even when they're wrong, have their hearts in the right place and
are therefore much less dangerous. Taking up the cause of the former gives
ammunition to the barbarians."238 Much the same ideological polarization
obtains in informal discussions of environmental laws and policies,
particularly in respect of climate change.
The cost of close-mindedness, be it liberal or conservative, libertarian
or communitarian, is considerable.239 The political quagmire of climate
change mitigation and oil pipeline project assessment in Canada is a case
in point. As noted above, the National Energy Board's (NEB) ongoing
review of the Energy East oil pipeline project proposal has generated
political and public controversy. Moreover, the NEB's review has thus far
run afoul of many of the elements of Ecolawgic.
The structure of the NEB's review is dictated by the government's
interim project assessment regulations applicable to the Energy East
project proposal (as well as the Trans Mountain pipeline proposal).240
The interim regulations stipulate that the government's decisions on
Energy East and Trans Mountain will be based on science and traditional
Indigenous knowledge; the views of the public, including affected
communities and Indigenous peoples; and the direct and upstream GHG
emissions that can be linked to pipelines.24 1 This approach, however, is
internally inconsistent and incoherent in light of the fact that the majority
of GHG emissions attributable to an oil pipeline are downstream emissions,
which are excluded from the government's review.242 Moreover, new oil
pipeline construction is arguably irreconcilable with Canada's domestic
commitment to transition to a clean, renewable energy-based economy,243
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and its international commitment to pursue economy-wide reductions in
GHG emissions.244
Nor has the NEB's review of the Energy East proposal in particular
proven to be neutral or impartial. As of this writing, public hearings
scheduled to take place in Montreal were disrupted and ultimately
suspended due to protests alleging, among other things, that the Board
has compromised its credibility. As recounted by The Globe andMail, the
controversy dates back to 2015, when two of the three NEB commissioners
charged with overseeing the assessment of Energy East initiated contact
and met privately with former Quebec premier Jean Charest, who at the
time of the meeting was under contract as a lobbyist for Energy East's
proponent, TransCanada Corp. Making matters worse, the NEB initiallyand incredibly-claimed that Mr. Charest did not discuss Energy East
with the NEB's commissioners. The NEB proceeded to apologize, but
maintained-equally incredibly-that the commissioners were unaware
that Mr. Charest was a lobbyist for TransCanada. Then the NEB claimed
that its commissioners had also met privately with other Energy East
stakeholders, including environmental groups purportedly opposed to the
project, as its commissioners prepared for the project's public hearings.2 45
These revelations followed and exacerbated an earlier ethical breach. Late
in the 2015 federal election campaign, Justin Trudeau was compelled to
fire the co-chair of his campaign (and former chief of staff to Charest),
Dan Gagnier, when it emerged that Gagnier was simultaneously advising
TransCanada Corp. about how to lobby a possible Liberal government
in support of Energy East.2 46 Dealings like these are unlikely to fulfill
what Canada's Minister of Natural Resources Jim Carr states as the
government's obligation to "rebuild the public's trust while maintaining
certainty for industry and ensuring a thorough [environmental assessment]
247
process that is fair transparentand responsible."
Plainly, no single party, model, or theory has a monopoly over the
best approach to a public policy problem as superwicked, polyjural, and
polycentric as climate change and sustainability in the Anthropocene .248
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While Pardy's Ecolawgic ultimately falls short of providing a single,
abstract, generally-applicable rule capable of resolving such issues, let
alone the overarching issue of mitigating GHG emissions and accelerating
the transition to a sustainability-based economy, as discussed in the
previous part of this article, his manifesto may nonetheless be usefully read
as a series of principles against which regulatory proposals and processes
may be critically assessed.
What is more, Pardy's Ecolawgic and his general rule of environmental
law that opens this part illustrate the rich complexity and potential of
means/end complexes. The ends of Pardy's rule of environmental law are
manifold and overlap significantly with those ofthe many other approaches
to public interest regulation referenced and discussed throughout this
article. The potential for greater rapprochement should not be overlooked.
As Singer notes in the ultimately optimistic conclusion to his analysis of
markets and regulation in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, "[1]iberals
are right to remind conservatives that regulation is needed to structure
markets appropriately and define property rights, but conservatives are
right to remind liberals that the best way to promote equality is by those
properly structured markets and property rights."249
Finally, Pardy's Ecolawgic effectively gestures toward a
democratically accountable approach to what is arguably the root problem
of Canadian environmental law and policy: the outsize and pernicious
influence of special interest over government policy on matters of public
interest.250 To date, neither market-based approaches nor the technocratic,
managerialist approaches typical of liberal legal theory favouring the
expertise, autonomy, and authority of administrative agencies251 has
succeeded in imagining a rule-making and policy-making regime immune
to this problem. Ecolawgic's emphasis on impartiality, fairness, and the
establishment of order arising out of autonomous individual actions
shares a great deal with emerging scholarship on regulation and law
reform that argues for iterative interaction and experimentation across
multiple policymaking domains having the potential to establish common
standards and shared commitments over time.252 In this way, Ecolawgic
points toward a potentially promising future of environmental legal theory
and practice for the Anthropocene.
249. Singer, supra note 90 at 176.
250. See, e.g., MacLean, "Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law," supra note
160.
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